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FILE:

Office: MADRID, SPAIN

Date:

IN RE:

APPLICATION:

Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility under section § 212(a)(9)(B) of

the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:

**SELF-REPRESENTED** 

**INSTRUCTIONS:** 

Elen L. 90

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

Robert P. Wiemann, Director

Administrative Appeals Office

**DISCUSSION**: The waiver application was denied by the Acting Officer in Charge, Madrid, Spain. The matter is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The applicant is a native and citizen of Tunisia who was found to be inadmissible to the United States pursuant to § 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II), for having been unlawfully present in the United States for more than one year and seeking readmission within 10 years of his last departure from the United States. The applicant is married to a citizen of the United States and seeks a waiver of inadmissibility in order to reside in the United States with his wife and children.

The acting officer in charge found that based on the evidence in the record, the applicant had failed to establish extreme hardship to his U.S. citizen spouse. The application was denied accordingly. On appeal, the applicant writes that his wife suffers extreme hardship, because she has health problems and is separated from the applicant and their daughter. The applicant has not submitted any statements or evidence, however, that overcome the acting officer in charge's reasons for denying the waiver application.

Section 212(a)(9)(B) of the Act provides, in pertinent part:

- (B) Aliens Unlawfully Present.-
  - (i) In general. Any alien (other than an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence) who-

. . .

(II) has been unlawfully present in the United States for one year or more, and who again seeks admission within 10 years of the date of such alien's departure or removal from the United States, is inadmissible.

. . . .

(v) Waiver. – The Attorney General [now the Secretary of Homeland Security (Secretary)] has sole discretion to waive clause (i) in the case of an immigrant who is the spouse or son or daughter of a United States citizen or of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, if it is established to the satisfaction of the Attorney General [Secretary] that the refusal of admission to such immigrant alien would result in extreme hardship to the citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of such alien.

The record indicates that the applicant was present in the United States without authorization from approximately March 1998 to March 2001. The applicant thus accrued over one year of unlawful presence,

and he seeks readmission within ten years of his last departure from the United States. The applicant is, therefore, inadmissible to the United States under § 212(a)(9)(B)(II) of the Act.

A § 212(a)(9)(B)(v) waiver of the bar to admission resulting from § 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) of the Act is dependent first upon a showing that the bar imposes an extreme hardship to the U.S. citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of the applicant. Hardship the alien himself or his child experiences upon removal is irrelevant to § 212(a)(9)(B)(v) waiver proceedings. Once extreme hardship is established, it is but one favorable factor to be considered in the determination of whether the Secretary should exercise discretion. See Matter of Mendez, 21 I&N Dec. 296 (BIA 1996).

Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez, 22 I&N Dec. 560 (BIA 1999) provides a list of factors the Board of Immigration Appeals deems relevant in determining whether an alien has established extreme hardship pursuant to § 212(i) of the Act. These factors include the presence of a lawful permanent resident or United States citizen spouse or parent in this country; the qualifying relative's family ties outside the United States; the conditions in the country or countries to which the qualifying relative would relocate and the extent of the qualifying relative's ties in such countries; the financial impact of departure from this country; and significant conditions of health, particularly when tied to an unavailability of suitable medical care in the country to which the qualifying relative would relocate.

The applicant asserts that his wife did not like Tunisia, and she prefers to have their children educated in the United States. The AAO notes that the applicant's wife is not obligated to relocate to Tunisia, however. The applicant also states that his wife will experience extreme hardship if she remains in the United States without the applicant. The applicant contends that his wife cannot work full time; hence, his absence causes her financial hardship. The record contains a note dated November 11, 2003 from D.O. stating that the applicant suffers from back pain which limits her ability to work. This note does not establish that the applicant's wife is disabled or to what extent she is able to work. The note also does not establish that the applicant's wife is unable to function without her husband, due to her health condition. The record does not contain evidence establishing the applicant's wife's financial status or evidence that the applicant cannot contribute to his family's support while he is in Tunisia. The applicant states that his wife's separation from the applicant and their daughter, who lives with the applicant in Tunisia, causes the applicant's wife extreme emotional hardship. The evidence, however, does not show that the applicant's wife's suffering is greater than that which is usually attendant in similar situations.

U.S. court decisions have repeatedly held that the common results of deportation or exclusion are insufficient to prove extreme hardship. See Hassan v. INS, 927 F.2d 465, 468 (9th Cir. 1991). For example, Matter of Pilch, 21 I&N Dec. 627 (BIA 1996), held that emotional hardship caused by severing family and community ties is a common result of deportation and does not constitute extreme hardship. In addition, Perez v. INS, 96 F.3d 390 (9th Cir. 1996), held that the common results of deportation are insufficient to prove extreme hardship and defined extreme hardship as hardship that was unusual or beyond that which would normally be expected upon deportation. Hassan v. INS, supra, held further that the uprooting of family and separation from friends does not necessarily amount to extreme hardship but rather represents the type of inconvenience and hardship experienced by the families of most aliens being deported. Moreover, the U.S. Supreme Court

has held that the mere showing of economic detriment to qualifying family members is insufficient to warrant a finding of extreme hardship. *INS v. Jong Ha Wang*, 450 U.S. 139 (1981).

The AAO recognizes that the applicant's wife suffers hardship as a result of separation from the applicant. However, her situation, if she remains in the United States, is typical to individuals separated as a result of deportation or exclusion and does not rise to the level of extreme hardship.

A review of the documentation in the record fails to establish the existence of extreme hardship to the applicant's spouse caused by the applicant's inadmissibility to the United States. Having found the applicant statutorily ineligible for relief, no purpose would be served in discussing whether he merits a waiver as a matter of discretion.

In proceedings for application for waiver of grounds of inadmissibility under § 212(a)(9)(B) of the Act, the burden of proving eligibility remains entirely with the applicant. See § 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. Here, the applicant has not met that burden. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed.

**ORDER:** The appeal is dismissed.